Catégorie C72 - Jeux non-coopératifs
Documents disponibles dans cette catégorie (28)
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Article : Revues - Articles
Working Paper
Hubert Kempf, Auteur ; Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur | Université Paris Sorbonne | Documents de Travail, CES Sorbonne, ISSN 1955-611X | 2010In this paper, we extend the stansard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play [...]
Working Paper
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur ; Magnus Hoffmann, Auteur | Clermont-Ferrand : Centre d'études et de recherches sur le développement international (Cerdi) | Études et Documents Cerdi, ISSN 2114-7957 | 2010The aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to cases where the reaction functions are non-motononic, as for instance in the literature on contest. Following the taxonomy of social dil[...]
Article : Revues - Articles
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur ; Magnus Hoffmann, Auteur |We examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two-player contest. The timing of moves, determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endog[...]
Working Paper
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur ; Magnus Hoffmann, Auteur | Clermont-Ferrand : Centre d'études et de recherches sur le développement international (Cerdi) | Études et Documents Cerdi, ISSN 2114-7957 | 2010This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a twoplayer contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves, determined in a pre‐play stage prior to the contest‐subgame, as well as the value of the pri[...]
Article : Revues - Articles
Magnus Hoffmann, Auteur ; Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur |The aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game (ETG) proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (Games and Economic Behavior, 1990, 2, 29 − 46) by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non-monotonic with respe[...]
Article : Revues - Articles
Hubert Kempf, Auteur ; Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur |Ogawa (Int Tax Public Financ 20(3):474–484, 2013) discusses the analysis of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J Public Econ 94(9–10):768–776, 2010a) by taking into account capital ownership in the government’s objective functions. He establishes that the[...]
Working Paper
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur | Clermont-Ferrand : Centre d'études et de recherches sur le développement international (Cerdi) | Études et Documents Cerdi, ISSN 2114-7957 | 2016Pareto-improving tax coordination, and even tax harmonization, are Nash implementable between sovereign countries without any supranational tax authorities. Following Schelling's approach, we consider voluntary commitment, which constrains count[...]
Article : Revues - Articles
A reputation of competence in solving a particular problem is useful only if the prob-lem remains in the future. Hence, there is an incentive to keep the “enemy” alive: Anagent may do wrong in his or her job precisely because he or she is compet[...]
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Menuet, Maxime ; Patrick Villieu | Clermont-Ferrand : Centre d'études et de recherches sur le développement international (Cerdi) | Zoom sur la recherche | 2020-06Why don't politicians solve undesirable problems? One reason is that politicians may be induced not to solve the problems in order to keep an electoral advantage. This article shows that, if the politicians’ career depends on the [...]
Article : Revues - Articles
Tax competition is often associated with the “race to the bottom:” a decrease in the tax rate of one jurisdiction (country, region or municipality) triggers similar reactions in neighboring jurisdictions. This race can be related to two properti[...]
Working Paper
Hubert Kempf, Auteur ; Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur | Université Paris Sorbonne | Documents de Travail, CES Sorbonne, ISSN 1955-611X | 2010-05This note investigates the endogenous choice of leadership in commodity tax competition. We apply an endogenous timing game, where jurisdictions commit themselves to lead or to follow, to the Kanbur and Keen (1993) model. We show that the Subgam[...]
Working Paper
The present paper studies the causes and duration of wars by building a war of attrition game, and explores the effect of overconfidence in such settings. During the fight, each player infers his opponent's inclination in surrendering given two [...]
