| Titre : | Surpassing the sovereign state : the wealth, self-rule, and security advantages of partially independent territories |
| Auteurs : | David A. Rezvani, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Ouvrages |
| Editeur : | Oxford University Press, 2014 |
| ISBN/ISSN/EAN : | 978-0-19-968849-4 |
| Format : | 1 vol. (ix, 387 p.) / illustrations, maps / 24 cm |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
[Eurovoc] DROIT > droit civil > droit civil > droit des obligations > dette [Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > politique économique [Eurovoc] GÉOGRAPHIE > Afrique > Afrique subsaharienne > Afrique méridionale > Afrique du Sud |
| Résumé : | Abstract : "This book will show that in region after region throughout the world partially independent territories (PITs)—including Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, Kurdistan, New Caledonia, and others—tend to be wealthier and more secure than their sovereign state counterparts. Often ignored because of their small size, lack of militaries, and divided powers, the PITs that produce these advantages are responsible for nearly one-fifth of global capital flows, serve as solutions for some of the world’s most intractable nationalistic disputes, and furnish important capabilities for sovereign states. The existence and capabilities of these polities contradict widely held assumptions of sovereign state pre-eminence and give rise to a range of puzzling issues that will be addressed by this book. Why do local nationalistically distinct populations accept partially independent unions? What guarantees do these polities have that their powers will not be usurped by internal and external adversaries? What makes core states (which divide and share powers with PITs) willing to part with some of their sovereignty amidst fears that their countries will fully fragment? What are the prospects for the independence of Scotland, Catalonia, Puerto Rico, and the nearly 50 PITs around the globe? This book explains how these political unions emerge, maintain themselves, and sometimes come to an end." |
| Note de contenu : |
Part I: Theoretical Framework
1: Introduction 2: Partial Independence Advantages and Evolution Part II: Self-Determination 3: Domestic and International Structural Amendment 4: Civil Order through Conventional Rules in the British Context: The British Dominions and Northern Ireland 5: From Secessionism to Mutual Agreement in the American Context: The Case of Puerto Rico 6: Sham Federacy: France's Indochinese Free States, China's Autonomous Regions, South Africa's Bantustans, and America's Indian Territories Part III: Economic Status, Security, and Dynamics 7: Sovereign State Weakness 8: Wealth and Security Advantages of Partial Independence 9: Predicting the Dynamics of Partially Independent Territories 10: Conclusion |
Exemplaires (1)
| Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 004981 | P 382 | Livre | Centre de documentation du CERDI / Ecole d'Economie | Salle de lecture | Disponible |
