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Titre :
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The Arrow impossibility theorem
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Auteurs :
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Eric Maskin, Auteur ;
Amartya Sen, Auteur
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Type de document :
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Ouvrages
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Editeur :
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New York : Columbia University Press, 2014
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ISBN/ISSN/EAN :
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978-0-231-15328-7
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Format :
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152 pages / illustrations / 22 cm
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Langues:
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Anglais
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Catégories :
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[Eurovoc] VIE POLITIQUE > procédure électorale et vote > vote
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Tags :
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social choice
;
probabilites
;
mathematical models
;
collective choice
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Résumé :
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Kenneth J. Arrow's "impossibility theorem" was a watershed in welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice. This book explores the implications of Arrow's theorem. Amartya Sen considers its value and limitations in relation to social reasoning, and Eric Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal.
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