Note de contenu :
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Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi
1317–1344
Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky
1345–1373
Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?
Mikel Pérez-Nievas
1375–1406
Conveying value via categories
Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray
1407–1439
"Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game
Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart
1441–1474
Information design in multi-stage games
Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou
1475–1509
Attack and interception in networks
Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Bhaskar Dutta
1511–1546
Surprise and default in general equilibrium
Keisuke Teeple
1547–1583
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs
Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, and Philipp Strack
1585–1622
Robust contracting under double moral hazard
Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte
1623–1663
Generalized compensation principle
Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Nicolas Werquin
1665–1710
Stability in repeated matching markets
Ce Liu
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX
1711–1757
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