| Titre : | Economics and the theory of games |
| Auteurs : | Fernando Vega-Redondo, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Ouvrages |
| Editeur : | Cambridge University Press, 2003 |
| ISBN/ISSN/EAN : | 978-0-521-77590-8 |
| Format : | 1 vol. (XII-512 p.) / 26 cm |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
[Eurovoc] ÉCHANGES ÉCONOMIQUES ET COMMERCIAUX > consommation > biens et services > biens publics [Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > analyse économique [Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > analyse économique > analyse économique > économétrie [Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > analyse économique > analyse économique > microéconomie [Eurovoc] FINANCES > assurance |
| Tags : | equilibrium analysis ; game theory ; théorie des jeux ; equilibrium model ; mathematical economics ; political economy ; quantitative methods |
| Résumé : |
This textbook offers a systematic, self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics. Starting with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations, the discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts, their main refinements, games played under incomplete information, and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, there is a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics, e.g. oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions. The theory and applications covered in the first part of the book fall under the so-called 'classical' approach to game theory, which is founded on the paradigm of players' unlimited rationality. The second part shifts towards topics that no longer abide by that paradigm. This leads to the study of topics such as the interplay between evolution and rationality.
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| Note de contenu : |
CHAPTER 1 Theoretical framework
CHAPTER 2 Strategic-form analysis: theory CHAPTER 3 Strategic-form analysis: applications CHAPTER 4 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: theory CHAPTER 5 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: applications CHAPTER 6 Incomplete information: theory CHAPTER 7 Incomplete information: applications CHAPTER 8 Repeated interaction: theory CHAPTER 9 Repeated interaction: applications CHAPTER 10 Evolution and rationality CHAPTER 11 Learning to play CHAPTER 12 Social learning and equilibrium selection. |
Exemplaires (1)
| Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 000192 | X 908 | Livre | Centre de documentation du CERDI / Ecole d'Economie | Salle de lecture | Disponible |
