| Titre : | Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics |
| Auteurs : | Torsten Persson, Auteur ; Guido Tabellini, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Ouvrages |
| Editeur : | Chur : Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990 |
| Collection : | Fundamentals of pure and applied economics, 0191-1708, num. v. 38. Macroeconomic theory section |
| ISBN/ISSN/EAN : | 978-3-7186-5029-3 |
| Format : | 1 vol. (X-187 p.) / ill. / 22 cm |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
[Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > analyse économique > analyse économique > macroéconomie [Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > politique économique [Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > situation économique > condition économique [Eurovoc] FINANCES > économie monétaire > politique monétaire [Eurovoc] FINANCES > fiscalité > impôt sur le capital > impôt sur la fortune [Eurovoc] FINANCES > fiscalité > politique fiscale |
| Tags : | mathematical models |
| Résumé : | 4e de couv : "This is the first book in rapidly growing literature that follows a new and game-theoretic approach to analysing positive and normative issues in macroeconomic policy. Dealing with monetary as well as fiscal policy, the authors survey the work to date and also present new results. Their approach focuses on the incentive problems in the economic-political decision process and leads naturally to a discussion of what policies are “credible” and “politically feasible” – issue the traditional macroeconomic approach simply cannot address. This book integrates seemingly disparate contributions into a common framework and illustrates the underlying methodology with simple but complete examples. Because of its full coverage and relative simplicity, this book is likely to become an important reference for graduate students and for researchers in macroeconomics and related areas." |
| Note de contenu : |
1. Economic policy as a game
2. Commitment versus discretion in monetary policy 3. Reputation and sequential rationality 4. Reputation and signalling 5. Elections and monetary policy 6. Commitment versus discretion in wealth taxation 7. Social institutions and credible tax policy 8. Credibility and public debt management 9. The political economy of government debt 10 Conclusions |
Exemplaires (1)
| Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 004760 | P 276 | Livre | Centre de documentation du CERDI / Ecole d'Economie | Salle de lecture | Disponible |
