| Titre : | Endogenous timing game with non-monotonic reaction functions |
| Auteurs : | Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Auteur ; Magnus Hoffmann, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Working Paper |
| Mention d'édition : | April 2010 |
| Editeur : | Clermont-Ferrand : Centre d'études et de recherches sur le développement international (Cerdi), 2010 |
| Collection : | Études et Documents Cerdi, ISSN 2114-7957, num. 17 |
| Format : | 21 p. |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
[Eurovoc] FINANCES > fiscalité > impôt |
| Tags : | first-mover advantage ; endogenous timing game ; second-mover incentive ; subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium ; Nash Equilibrium |
| Résumé : | The aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to cases where the reaction functions are non-motononic, as for instance in the literature on contest. Following the taxonomy of social dilemma provided by Eaton (2004) we consider several pos- sible situations depending on the nature of interactions (plain complementarity or plain substituability and strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability). Under the assumptions of the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we highlight the presence of a first-mover advantage or a second-mover incentive only depending on the nature of cross-effects in players' payoff functions and the slopes of their reaction functions at the Nash equilibrium of the static game. These properties allow us to determine rigorously the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the ten studied situations. We establish under which conditions on the nature of interactions a leader emerges at the SPNE |
| Axe de recherche : | Financement du développement |
| En ligne : | https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00553130 |
Documents numériques (1)
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00553130/file/2010.17.pdf URL |
