| Titre : | Does the system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal eliminate politically motivated targeting? |
| Auteurs : | Emilie Caldeira, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Working Paper |
| Mention d'édition : | March 2011 |
| Editeur : | Clermont-Ferrand : Centre d'études et de recherches sur le développement international (Cerdi), 2011 |
| Collection : | Études et Documents Cerdi, ISSN 2114-7957, num. 05 |
| Format : | 29 p. |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
[Eurovoc] ÉCONOMIE > analyse économique > analyse économique > économétrie > modèle économique [Eurovoc] GÉOGRAPHIE > Afrique > Afrique subsaharienne > Afrique occidentale > Sénégal [JEL] H - Économie publique > H2 - Fiscalité, subventions et revenus > H20 - Généralités |
| Tags : | decentralization ; political economy ; intergovernmental transfers ; Senegal |
| Résumé : | While there is a large body of literature on the determinants of allocation of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in developed countries, this kind of study is still very limited for developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan countries. Using an original micro-level public finance panel data from Senegal, we address three issues: (1) Does the Senegalese allocation system of fiscal transfers conform to the guidance of the normative theory, in particular, to the equity principle? (2) Does this allocation system eliminate the politically motivated targeting of transfers? (3) If not, what kind of political factors explain the horizontal allocation of resources? By estimating a panel data for 67 local governments ("communes"), from 1997 to 2009, we find that equity concerns do not affect the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal, leading to the conclusion that the resources distribution system does not comply with the dictates of normative theory. Moreover, we find evidence that political considerations influence the horizontal allocation of fiscal transfers. In particular, our analysis suggests that transfers allocation follows a pattern of tactical redistribution more than patronage, swing communes being targeted while partisan communes are not. |
| Axe de recherche : | Financement du développement |
| En ligne : | https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00576508 |
| Edition suivante : |
Documents numériques (1)
 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00576508/file/2011.05.pdf URL |
